Deep-Sea Fishing Policy and Fish workers’ Struggle in India!

During the 1990s, with the introduction of policies of liberalization and privatization, the Government of India (Gol) offered incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in fisheries sector and issued licenses to joint-venture and foreign fishing vessels. These export-oriented joint- ventures are adversely affecting the inshore resources and are displacing fisher-folk from their secure source of livelihood. The majority of fish- workers have employed traditional way of fishing while a small percentage owns mechanized boats and big trawlers.

According to an estimate:

“The marine fishing occupation has been spread across nine littoral states covering a coast line of over 7,500 kms. It is the largest commu­nity based traditional occupation in our country employing about 9 million people of which, more than 80 per cent are subsistence workers”.

The fisher people all over the country have responded by coming together under the banner of National Fisheries Action Committee Against Joint Ventures (NFACAJV) and are struggling to secure their due rights over inshore resources.

We will briefly look at the policies of the government, their conse­quences, fish workers’ response to them, and also the response of the govern­ment to fisher people s response as the processes of liberalization unfold and fish workers’ agitation gets intensified.

1. The Government Policy:

The New Economic Policy (NEP) states that “India’s fishery resources being grossly underutilized, significant opportunities exist for corporate units in the areas of preservation and exports”. The deep-sea fishing (DSF) policy was announced by the Gol in March 1991.

The main components of the DSF policy are:

“(1) Leasing of foreign vessels for operation in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);

(2) Test fishing by engaging foreign fishing vessels; and,

(3) Joint ventures between Indian and foreign companies in deep-sea fishing (DSF), processing and marketing”.

The government has argued that the inshore fishery resources of our country are over- exploited and the resources beyond this zone are under-exploited and thereby provide a good scope for further exploitation. However, the exploitation of fishery resources off the inshore is not within the technical capabilities of the traditional/small-scale mechanized fishing sector.

Thus, in order to bridge this gap between potential and production, the GoI has allowed private Indian entrepreneurs to enter into joint ventures with foreign counterparts for exploiting the hitherto under-exploited fishery resources beyond the inshore area. The government has granted about 170 licenses involving over 800 vessels in joint ventures as a part of its policy to promote joint ventures.

2. A Critique:

The DSF policy 1991 of the Gol should be seen as a part of the overall effort on the part of the state and policy makers to globalize and liberalize the Indian economy. Such a policy benefits only domestic and foreign private interests at the cost of the needs of the local fish workers and coastal ecology. The experts are keen to point out that the resources targeted for deep-sea fishing are unsuited for large-scale commercial exploitation.

According to an estimate, “The productivity of the deep-sea is computed at 0.93 t/sq km as against 10.75 t/sq km in the inshore sea”. According to the same estimate, “While the total marine fish production of India in 1991—92 was estimated to be 24.70 lakh tonnes, the share of the deep-sea fishing sector was judged to be just one per cent of this. Some 99 per cent of the output came from the inshore sea and was contributed by small-scale mechanized and artisanal fishing”.

It is interesting to look at what John Kurien has to say about the DSF policy:

“In a tropical sea ecosystem, where the specie-interactions are highly complex and little studied, even if we assume that the joint venture vessels stay in the real ‘deep sea’, the impact which the operations will have on the rest of the ecosystem and the resources therein are bound to be damaging. Many of the fish species are ‘straddling stocks’ which move in and out of the inshore”.

3. The Struggle:

Fish workers all over the country responded by spontaneous protests. They raised several questions regarding the impending impact of DSF on coastal resources and ecology, the adverse effects of large-scale DSF operations on the traditional/small-scale mechanized fishing communities, and also about its impact on internal/domestic fish consumption.

By early 1994 these spontaneous and scattered protests culminated into the formation of the National Fish workers’ Forum (NFF) — a joint forum of small-scale artisanal fish worker unions from various parts of the country. The NFF gave a call on February 4, 1994 to protest against the granting of license to joint ventures and MNCs. A complete ‘fish band’ was observed and no fishing or selling and purchasing of fish took place.

The NFACAJV was set up in May 1994 with a single point agenda: “Cancel all licenses issued to joint ventures for deep-sea fishing”. Fish workers went on another two-day strike on November 23—24, 1994, which attracted national and international media attention. In some areas, small-scale fish workers surrounded foreign vessels and prevented them from going to the seas. In other parts, people expressed their solidarity with agitating fish workers through rallies, sit-ins and fasts.

This strike was supported and endorsed by all major central trade unions and the popular social and environmental movements of the country. Commenting upon the large public support which fish workers could muster up, John Kurien says:

“Transcending class, caste, religious, language and political affiliation, a consortium of those with a stake in Indian fisheries — artisanal fishermen, vendors, trawler owners and workers, processing unit operators and workers, consumer right groups and environmental activists – came together to oppose what they perceived to be a common threat to natural resources, livelihoods and food. They called themselves the National Fisheries Action Campaign Against Joint Ventures (NFACAJV). They take the credit for the first direct-action campaign against a concrete programme of the liberalization era”.

However, the government’s response was contradictory. The then Minister for Food Processing, Tarun Gogoi announced in the Parliament on December 15, 1994 that fresh licenses would not be issued. The Murari Committee was constituted in February 1995 to review the 1991 DSF policy in response to the countrywide agitation of NFACAJV in November 1994. But despite all this, the granting of licenses continued and the NFACAJV had to resume its agitation.

In May 1995, Thomas Kochery, chairperson of the NFF and convener of the NFACAJV, went on a hunger strike at Porbandar, the birthplace of Mahatma Gandhi. The strike evoked widespread support and positive response from various political parties and trade unions.

Thomas Kochery called off his fast at the assurance of the then government headed by P.V. Narasimha Rao to broadbase and reconstitutes the Murari Committee. Initially the Murari Committee had had 15 members, all bureaucrats. In accordance with the demands of NFACAJV the committee was reconstituted which had 41 members — 16 MPs, 6 representatives of fishing interests and eminent scientists and government officials.

This newly-constituted committee functioned between June 1995 and February 1996 when it submitted its report. The members of this committee visited the coastal areas and studied the country’s deep- sea fishing. The Murari Committee recommended that subject to certain legal considerations all joint venture licenses be revoked. The last re­commendation (No. 21) of the Murari Committee said: “This new policy should be implemented by the Ministry within six months”.

On February 23, 1996 the government announced some interim reliefs based on the recommendations of the Murari Committee. The deadline of six months set up by the Murari Committee expired on August 6, 1996. All efforts of NFACAJV to get the United Front government to implement the most important recommendation of the Murari Committee report to cancel all licenses for all forms of joint ventures had failed. On August 7, 1996 Thomas Kochery started a fast in Mumbai. The then Minister of State for Food Processing, Dilip Kumar Ray visited the fasting leader on August 13, and read out a message seeking a time of one month for the new govern­ment to implement all the recommendations of the committee.

On August 14, 1996, the fish workers marched in a rally to the India Gate to celebrate their victory.

The agitation was withdrawn following an assurance by the Minister to comply with two demands of NFACAJV:

(1) All hurdles to the cancellation of licenses would be removed, and

(2) All files concerning issue of licenses would be made available to the NFACAJV for cross-checking.

In February 1997 the government announced that all the pending applications for joint venture licenses stood rejected and that no new appli­cation would be entertained, but licenses already granted would continue to be in effect. While fish workers welcomed the government’s decision not to further issue licenses, they strongly opposed the continuation of existing operations.

The NFACAJV launched its new phase of agitation in March 1997. The fish workers blockaded the harbours of Kandla in Gujarat, Mumbai in Maharashtra and Vishakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh on 5th and 6th March 1997. The harbour blockades were called off on March 7, 1997 following a written assurance by the then Union Minister of Food Processing Industries to take several concrete measures.

4. The Judicial Intervention:

While endorsing the broad thrust of the Murari Committee report, the NFACAJV wanted amendments to certain recommendations. The most far-reaching demand for amendment related to the most important recommendation of the report which had recommended the immediate cancellation of all permits and licenses issued for all forms of joint venture, chartered, lease and test fishing “subject to legal processes as may be required”.

The NFACAJV was in favour of a complete restructuring of the latter phrase on the following lines: “Legal impediments, if any, must be removed through change of rules, orders and/or even through legal or constitutional amendments”.

In this context the NFACAJV quoted the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court (June 1994) in “The state of Kerala versus the Trawler Owners Association” of 1993. It is interesting to look at this judgment since here the apex court of our land takes position on issues of development and livelihood. In this judgment, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy had observed:

“… The Government of Kerala is perfectly justified in adopting the attitude that the public interest cannot be determined only by looking at the quantum of fish caught in a year … (but is) justified in saying that it is under an obligation to protect the economic interest of the traditional fishermen and ensure that they are not deprived of their slender means of livelihood.

Whether one calls it distributive justice or development with a human face, the ultimate truth is that the objective of all development is the human being. There can be no development for the sake of development. Priorities ought not be inverted nor the true perspective lost in the quest for more production”.

Closely related to deep-sea fishing (DSF) policy is the enormous expansion of shrimp aquaculture in the wake of liberalization. Like DSF policy, intensive shrimp aquaculture has also resulted in a worsening of the environmental situation and the displacement of local communities from their means of livelihood. The next section makes an attempt to highlight disastrous consequences of intensive shrimp aquaculture and people’s response to them.